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1 
The imaginary constitution of financial crises 
Abstract 
This paper proposes an alternative sociological framework for dealing with the 
imaginary constitution of financial crises. Theorisation of financial crises is often 
limited by dualistic juxtaposition of the rational and irrational, moral and immoral, 
calculative and intuitive, thus neglecting the imaginary structuring of such dyads in the 
construction of financial and fiscal realities. To address this lacuna, we introduce ideas 
from philosopher, Cornelius Castoriadis, and develop a framework that unpicks the 
often-suppressed, mediating and generative role of imagination in finance. On the one 
hand, we show how dominant forms of imagination enable the financialisation of 
contemporary societies, serving to sustain existing debt practices and lender–debtor 
relationships. On the other hand, we propose a reanimated ‘sociological imagination’ 
that offers potential avenues for establishing alternative social visions of the future that 
will enable re-thinking of the nature of debt, money and financial institutions. 
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From risk economies to the debt crisis: The neglected role of imagination 
Following the outbreak of the 2008 global economic crisis, governments in the USA 
and the EU sought to recapitalise their credit-bereft financial institutions through an 
unprecedented shift of privately-held risk to individual households. The unravelling of 
the crisis is now familiar: by 2007, widespread and largely unregulated and speculative 
use of financial instruments, such as high-risk derivative products, had led to 
increasingly unsustainable levels of ‘toxic’ debt in the USA’s financial systems that 
spread out to the Eurozone and across the globe, causing a wave of commercial bank 
bailouts, and pushing a number of states to the brink of default on their debts. At the 
same time, extensive adoption of fiscal austerity in the Eurozone was the dominant and 
persistent response to the crisis, with devastating consequences for countries in the 
European South (for detailed reviews of this process and its links to neoliberalism, see 
Centeno & Cohen, 2012; Coppola, 2018). 
Sociologists have examined how economic crises are precipitated by the social 
construction of financial markets, demonstrating in particular how risk and debt are co-
implicated in the production (and prediction) of ‘economic futures’ (e.g. Knorr Cetina 
& Preda, 2007; Mackenzie, 2011). Economists, on the other hand, have focused on 
excessive risk taking, which, it has been argued, was due to a ‘failure in modelling: a 
failure to understand systemic risk, and a failure to estimate well small probability 
events’ (Stiglitz, 2010). Yet, as Centeno and Cohen (2012) demonstrate, despite 
existing models’ rhetoric of criticism, the economic ‘rules of the game’ remain 
unchanged. Importantly for sociologists and social theorists, the ability to re-imagine 
ways out of the crisis (Aspers & Dodd, 2015; Adkins, 2009, also see Gane, 2011) seems 
also to have stagnated. As Gane and Back (2012, p. 419) put it, neoliberalism’s 
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permeating ability invites an ‘opening out’ to the world in the form of a heightened 
‘sensory attentiveness’ that would enable a ‘different kind of social imaginary’. 
A stream of recent edited collections and special issues in various fields of social 
science (e.g. Coleman & Tutton, 2017; Terranova, 2015; Dinerstein, Schwartz, & 
Taylor, 2014; Haiven & Berland, 2014) has initiated fruitful debate around more 
‘imaginative’ conceptual approaches to understanding the causes of the 2008 crisis. 
One such route has been offered by disciplines outside of sociology and economics, 
which have breathed new life into the study of finance and its vicissitudes. Of particular 
relevance to our discussion of the role of imagination is a surge of interest in links 
between speculative finance and the contemporary world of literary fiction and novels. 
A series of exciting new works (e.g. Crosthwaite, 2019; Higgins & O’Connell, 2019; 
Shonkwiler, 2017) demonstrate how the fictitiousness of capital, most starkly 
manifested in the intensified fictionality of modern financial instruments such as the 
derivative (which was arguably central to the credit crunch), has come to resemble the 
world of speculative fiction. Mary Poovey (2008), a pioneering figure in this genre of 
work, shows how literary forms of writing have mediated and reflected the operations 
of financial markets organised around credit and debt. 
More recently, there have been renewed calls to engage more closely with the 
social sciences, and more daringly with the ‘kinds of culture that feed on and feed into 
the regime of economic abstraction and financialization’, in order to explore how 
financial markets are ‘represented and imagined’ (Knight, 2013, p. 3). Yet little work 
has focused on the key role of imagination in constructing specific notions of risk, debt 
and obligation, which are implicated in the causes and deepening of the crisis. For 
instance, although the ‘imaginative practices’ surrounding the complex, technology-
supported products of financial innovation have been mainstreamed (e.g. Government 
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Office for Science, 2015), our understanding of the resulting social changes and the 
vocabularies we use to narrate these changes, including their implications, are lagging 
behind imaginative financial practices. 
In this article, we attempt to provide such a vocabulary, by suggesting a potential 
avenue for mobilising ‘sociological imagination’ in order to engage with financial 
crises.1 We argue that enacting the sociological imagination – the ability to provide 
critical scholarship aiming to impact on change (Mills, 1959) – seems more important 
than ever today (Gane, 2011), but this can no longer be confined to the realm of 
sociology. Works from the broader social sciences and philosophy must be engaged 
with in order to ‘debate important public issues and approaches from social theory 
outside of its own boundaries’ (Joas, 1989, p. 1184). This article seeks to do this by 
drawing on the works of political philosopher, Cornelius Castoriadis to propose an 
analysis of financial crises as the manifestation of a specific imaginary social order. 
For Castoriadis, imagination is the driver of all life and creativity (Castoriadis, 
1987); it ‘provides a framework for structuring and giving meaning to actions and 
behaviours of social collectivities, such as organizations and societies’ (Komporozos-
Athanasiou & Fotaki, 2015, p. 325). It is through a collective sense of imagination that 
a society is created, given coherence and identity, and also subjected to both mundane 
and radical social change. We develop these ideas to deepen and extend the notion of 
sociological imagination in critical social theory, by incorporating discursive, affective 
and representational dimensions to theorise its generative role in the constitution of 
financial crises. We propose that the performance of financial and calculative practices 
reflects dominant images of the future invested with meanings and affects by financial 
actors. It also foregrounds the potential for resistance to such images/meanings/affects 
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by enacting alternative imaginations; that is, re-imagining the nature of debt, money 
and financial institutions. 
The overall goal of this article is thus both deconstructive and constructive. First, 
we uncover the imaginary foundations of financialisation and how it has transformed 
our imaginations in determining who and what is valuable and imaginaries of debt and 
credit (Davies, 2018; Graeber, 2014; Lazzarato, 2015a, 2015b). We suggest that the 
current values encoded in our social imaginary, as ‘social forms that characterize 
Western modernity: the market economy, the public sphere, the self-governing people, 
among others’ (Taylor, 2002, p. 92), enable debt-fuelled crises, and unsustainable fiscal 
austerity as the dominant response to such crises. Second, we argue that possible 
responses to financialisation may emerge through a radical re-imagining of current 
arrangements to suggest different ways of organising vis-a-vis financial institutions. To 
do so, it is essential to introduce the notion of imagination as an enabler for enacting 
different values. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. The next section discusses 
debates on imagination which, as we argue, focus problematically on a dichotomy 
between rationality and irrationality. We then draw on Castoriadis to address the 
shortcomings of existing approaches and move beyond such hierarchical dualisms. We 
propose a framework that unpicks the role of imaginary conditions (including 
representations, discursive structures and affects; see also Komporozos-Athanasiou & 
Fotaki, 2015) of risk and debt relations in the constitution of financial crises. In 
conclusion, we argue for a need to recognise existing (and develop new) avenues 
through which to establish alternative social visions of the future, and highlight some 
wider implications for contemporary social theory. 
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The rationality versus irrationality debate in critical social theory 
As we have suggested so far, there has been little direct engagement with the 
importance of imagination in finance, especially around the entanglement of the 
rational and irrational in the performance of financial markets.2 Influential economic 
sociology studies have long rejected the notion of ‘disembedded’ rational economic 
agents, arguing that they are situated in complex webs of social ties and personal 
interactions (see, for instance, Granovetter & Swedberg, 2001; White, 1981; 
Granovetter, 1985), yet have tended to neglect the role of the irrational and have often 
failed to grasp the notions of the ‘imagination’ and the ‘imaginary’.3 This is despite 
nuanced theorisation of the intimate relationship between rationality and irrationality 
in classic texts (e.g. Marx and Weber), and despite contemporary consumerist culture 
(Boden & Williams, 2002) providing plentiful examples for sociologists interested in 
their inherent interplay in the constitution of social reality and in politics (Latimer & 
Skeggs, 2011). Nevertheless, in many sociological debates on markets and financial 
crises, irrationality continues to be defined with reference to – and juxtaposed against 
– rationality. 
Weber considers rationality most notably in relation to technical control through 
calculative thinking, although there are ‘moments where Weber admits that the 
irrational element applies to every experience’ (Sica, 1988, p. 172). His texts showcase 
this relationship between rational and irrational properties most fundamentally in the 
contradictory co-existence of the endless pursuit of capital accumulation, the asceticism 
of the Protestant ethic, and the belief in redemption. Thus, Weber is resistant to calling 
a certain type of human action ‘rational’ and another ‘irrational’: ‘The good question 
was not to ask: is this action rational … but rather to explore what is the rationality of 
this action’ (Szelenyi, 2016, p. 5). Other Weberian scholars, such as Wagner (1994) 
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and Swidler (1973), concur that Weber was particularly torn between the ‘progress’ of 
rationalisation and its irrational components: ‘[Weber] attempted to make intelligible 
this general process of the rationalization of our whole existence precisely because the 
rationality which emerges from this process is something specifically irrational and 
incomprehensible’ (Löwith, 1982, cited in Wagner, 1994, p. 64). 
In economic sociology, many observers have critically examined the recent crisis 
in the context of growing financialisation and the economics of risk shifting, associating 
irrationality with financial innovations such as derivative products (e.g. Huault & 
Rainelli-Le Montagner, 2009; Ahrne, Aspers, & Brunsson, 2014). Two relevant 
arguments are offered in these commentaries. One is that increasing systemic reliance 
on the financialised economy is in itself an outcome of the inherent irrationality of 
progressively deregulated markets and the opaqueness and complexity associated with 
these innovations (e.g. Bryan & Rafferty, 2014; MacKenzie & Millo, 2003). The other 
argument centres on how the widespread economic assumption of market rationality 
has been convincingly deconstructed in the wake of the financial crisis (e.g. Davies & 
McGoey, 2012; Engelen & Faulconbridge, 2009). For instance, Engelen and 
Faulconbridge (2009, p. 592) argue that the credit/debt crisis demonstrated how rational 
and irrational choices alike are mediated by conventions, affects and emotions such as 
‘greed’. In complementary and perhaps unintended ways, both arguments challenge 
regulatory systems’ ability to ‘tame the animal spirits of the market’ (Keynes, 1936, 
cited in Nicholson, Kiel, & Kiel‐Chisholm, 2011) and indebted governments’ ability to 
return to fiscal stability through ‘rational’ regulatory frameworks.4 
Overcoming the rationality/irrationality dualism through imagination 
A fruitful way of engaging with the tension between the rational and irrational in 
financial markets can be found in approaches that focus on the imaginary construction 
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of regulatory logic (Beckert, 2013; Beckert & Bronk 2018; see also Massumi, 2014). 
Their insights highlight the role of finance and, by extension, in their failures in 
neoliberal markets as possible consequences not of rational or irrational acts, but of 
financial actors drawing on imaginary constructions to create both rational and 
irrational realities. Beckert (2013) invites us to take the ‘fictions’ of markets more 
seriously, drawing our attention to the role of ‘present imaginaries of future situations 
that provide orientation in decision-making despite the uncertainty inherent in the 
situation’. Their power to convince is not bound ‘to rational calculation’ (Beckert, 
2013, p. 222). Boden and Williams (2002, p. 500) also argue that the dualism implied 
in the rationality/irrationality debate must be overcome in stressing, for instance, the 
‘hybrid emphasis on the rationally controlled decontrol of emotion’. To achieve this, 
they call for ‘reanimating the sociological imagination’ by ‘breathing new emotional 
life into its classically rationalist bones’ (Boden & Williams, 2002, p. 500). This call 
also resonates with Latimer and Skeggs (2011), who posit that any re-imagining of the 
political must go hand in hand with an exploration of imagination, as one of the key 
sites in which all political agendas are played out. Finally, Pyyhtinen (2016) proposes 
a re-structuring of sociological imagination to account for the material and relational 
aspects of social life. 
Other critiques seek to transcend this dualism by explicitly affording a central role 
to imagination. For instance, Haiven (2015) and Haiven and Berland (2014) discuss 
financialisation as an outcome of the suppression of imagination. Haiven sees 
imagination as inherently ‘positive’ and belonging to the realm of the creative arts and 
culture, while distinguishing it from the ‘irrational’ imaginary of capitalist production, 
which is disembodied, abstract and divorced from the lived reality of work. Seen 
through this lens, the global financial crisis is the outcome of the dominance of 
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capitalist irrationality, which takes the form of creativity striving for individualism and 
profit, rather than real imagination working toward the common good. Hence, for 
Haiven (2015), it is the suppression and financialisation of imagination that corrupts 
and undermines the reproduction of our own lives as we become increasingly 
overworked, privatised, alienated and wrapped in debt. In this way, capitalism’s 
inherent and recurrent crises are externalised onto individuals and communities. 
Such nuanced links between finance and the imagination can be traced as far back 
as Marx’s own discussion of ‘fictitious capital’, which established a close relationship 
between rationality, imagination and speculative futures.5 Marx’s insight perhaps 
captured most closely the future-oriented role of the imagination in his discussion of 
irrational longings and desires that perpetuate ‘market dis-equilibriums’. He explicitly 
recognised links between imagination and the production of a certain type of capitalist 
rationality when writing about ‘the imaginary appetites’ that replace real needs with 
‘fantasy, caprice and whim’ (Marx, 1972, cited in Lyng, 2005), leading to excessive 
consumption and alienation from the products of one’s work. 
Bryan and Rafferty (2014) show how a more nuanced view of imagination may 
illuminate the practices of financial actors in the years preceding the 2008 crisis. They 
discuss how the ‘imaginative acts’ of financial inventors ‘decompose social practices 
and events into attributes that can be “objectively” measured (not easily manipulated), 
of probabilities that can be calculated and prices configured, and for all of which 
enough “players” are willing to take each side of a contract to form a market’ (Bryan 
& Rafferty, 2014, p. 893). Specifically, the authors investigate ‘the social impact of the 
imaginary of derivatives’, and how derivatives embody an imminent development in 
capitalist markets and society at large. Their thesis is that a regulatory focus (such as 
that enforced in state bureaucracies) is insufficient to prevent failures triggered by risk-
10 
taking practices, insofar as it fails to address the social and imaginary constitution of 
those practices. In this vein, there have been increasing calls (e.g. Toscano, 2014; Albo, 
Gindin, & Panitch, 2010; Mattick, 2011) warning sociologists not ‘to give disciplinary 
support to the imprecise imaginary of a contemporary reformism, which regards the 
return of the state and of regulation as a panacea for crisis’ (Toscano, 2014, p. 1028). 
Our article responds to these calls by developing a framework that challenges the 
view of an inherently ‘positive’ imagination becoming (passively) ‘financialised’. 
Hence, rather than merely discussing an ‘imagination (in) crisis’ or a financialised 
imaginary resulting from a bureaucratic capture, it proposes that the unfolding of 
financial crises should be considered as an ‘imagination struggle’ between different, 
actively instituting types of dominant (financial) and alternative (social) imaginations. 
In so doing, it foregrounds the interplay of the financial and the social in the field of 
the imaginary. To achieve this, we now turn to the work of political philosopher, 
Cornelius Castoriadis. 
Re-engaging sociological imagination through Cornelius Castoriadis 
Castoriadis (1987) offers a sociologically-oriented view of human imagination as a 
structuring force for all meaningful activity. His theory of imagination is underpinned 
by three core concepts: representation, signification and affect. These serve as a 
generative matrix for the creation of meaning for individuals and societies 
(Komporozos-Athanasiou & Fotaki, 2015), and can be summarised as follows. First, 
representation is understood as a non-functional ability to produce new images that are 
not reflections but conditions of reality. Second, signification is positioned as openness 
and indeterminacy of meaning, as a conscious ‘act’ of breaking with inherited ‘closures 
of meaning’. Third, affect encompasses the desire to take ownership of indeterminacy, 
enabling the discovery of new meaning and potentialities. As it plays a key role in 
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connecting the psychic with the social/political, it re-enforces a sociological view of 
imagination. 
In offering a radical theory of imagination born out of the desire of the psyche and 
necessity, Castoriadis powerfully elucidates how the ‘actual’ institution of society is 
made possible, representable, and thus meaningful. As we have shown elsewhere 
(Komporozos-Athanasiou & Fotaki, 2015), he achieves this by rendering meaningless 
any dichotomies between the representational and non-representational, rational and 
irrational, and affective and discursive. Insofar as rationality is inherently constituted 
through imagination in a process of ‘instituting’, once a type of rationality has been 
‘instituted’ (such as ‘pseudo-rationality’; see Castoriadis, 1987), it becomes a 
measuring stick for various other significations and meanings, rendering them rational, 
irrational or even a-rational. In other words, specific (ir)rationalities are socially 
instituted norms and practices that govern social life and cannot exist outside collective 
rationalities. Simultaneously, by emphasising the creative function and potentiality of 
institutions rather than their role in (merely) reproducing (dominant) structures and 
meanings, Castoriadis (1987, p. 72) shows that ‘the historical world is the world of 
human doing’. 
The conceptual innovation of a productive (rather than reflective or merely re-
productive) imagination positioned at the centre of the social creation process has 
powerful implications for understanding how the social world is organised. As Joas 
(1989, p. 1188), reviewing Castoriadis’s work, puts it, ‘Castoriadis is working with 
concepts of the theory of action that cannot be made to fit the rigid dichotomy of 
theoretical models of rational action and their normative critique’. This is because he 
reconceptualises the entire idea of creative praxis as a stimulus for political action, 
originally conceived by Marx, through the imaginary (see also Kurasawa, 2000). 
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This is evident in Castoriadis’s discussion of autonomy in society’s positing of its 
own laws. He uses the example of Sophocles’ Antigone to show how autonomous 
action does not disclose a rationalist view of the world where one person’s right collides 
with another’s. Antigone’s notion of ‘right’ is not simply one-sided; it is her own. This 
question of ‘taking ownership’ of one’s own moral laws, and thus of one’s own 
imagination, is key in advancing a sociological imagination: its products (meanings, 
laws, institutions) are enacted though not necessarily determinable, and are therefore 
open to re-imagining. This view resonates with work by Ruth Levitas (2013), who 
builds on a long tradition of utopian thinking in political science and philosophy in 
challenging the dichotomy between real and ‘utopian’ futures. Following Ernst Bloch, 
Levitas foregrounds anticipatory consciousness, which animates the belief that a 
different reality and relationship with the future is possible. She thus rehabilitates what 
we can term, after Castoriadis, ‘imaginary strivings’. 
Importantly, this approach contributes nuances to C. W. Mills’s sociological 
imagination as a factor in facilitating social change, while providing further insights 
into the unravelling of financial crises. Specifically, Castoriadis’s anti-dualistic 
conception of rationality encompassing irrationality as ir(rationality) prompts us to 
discuss financial crisis as an ‘imagination struggle’. First, such a view suggests that 
imagination plays a subtle yet important role in structuring ‘the creation of rationalities’ 
which underpin not only financial institutions but also the regulatory systems aiming 
‘to control’ them. Second, this view corresponds with Mills’s (1959, p. 6) own claim 
that ‘sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the 
relations between the two within society’. In particular, Castoriadian imagination 
illuminates the mechanics of such relations between history and biography, revealing 
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the relationship between a society ‘instituting’ and being ‘instituted’ or, in his own 
words, ‘of history made and of history in the making’ (Castoriadis, 1987, p. 108). 
The ways through which this process of imaginary constitution is achieved 
comprises, as we have seen, representation, signification and affect. Crucially, 
imaginary constitution suggests that collective entanglements of images, discourses and 
affects may give rise to new representations and re-significations; they may institute 
new rationalities, which may escape dominant imaginations. The next section considers 
how this might be possible, focusing on the fiscal aspect of financial crises, and the 
constitution of debtor–creditor relations under the influence of financialisation. 
Discussion: Debt and austerity as crises of imagination 
Having discussed the role of imagination in creating dominant conceptions of 
(ir)rationality and its failures, we now consider the consequences of the crisis, 
experienced in the repositioning of social and political relations in terms of individual 
(private) and sovereign (state) debt. This development of debt relations has important 
material, political and ethical implications stemming from the financial crisis, which 
can be viewed as a struggle between different types of imagination (and their 
constitutive representations, significations and affects). On the one hand, there is the 
imagination embodied in rational and calculative/controlling practices of financial 
markets, which corresponds with the ‘instituted imagination’ in Castoriadis’s 
framework. This type of imagination reflects the dominant form of discursive 
significations with its concomitant representations of the future and corresponding 
affects. Yet although instituted imagination leads to a specific market-type rationality, 
it also co-exists with another type of ‘instituting imagination’ enacted by all ‘social 
doing’, including acts of both identification and dis-identification, with the potential to 
drive alternative visions of the future. 
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For instance, in the Eurozone crisis, we can trace the dominant imagination central 
to the workings of financial markets and institutions, as well as their regulatory systems. 
At its root lies a moral imperative to impose sacrifice and punishment for unsound 
economic practices and to reduce ‘profligate’ spending. While the target of such cuts is 
invariably the public spending that often benefits the most vulnerable groups, such 
policies are legitimised vis-a-vis its citizens as necessary to avert an even bigger crisis 
of state insolvency. This is, in fact, what weaves together the imagined financial futures 
by moulding perceptions of risk and debt, ultimately leading to a horizon of possibility 
that is at once dislocated and delimited. 
For example, Dubois (2014) argues that neoliberal economics in the late post-crisis 
capitalism did not re-invent the relationship of implicated actors (financial institutions, 
debtors and lender states) with the future, but rather extended it. The Eurozone’s 
sovereign debt crisis encapsulated this policy of ‘avoidance’ to address the causes of 
financial crises in the most spectacular and profound ways, while also echoing the 
narrative of ‘there is no alternative’ to austerity on the periphery of the Eurozone, in 
effect foreclosing the possibility of imagining alternative futures. This foreclosure 
relied on and served the purpose of suppressing the symbolic and material violence that 
indebtedness brought to weaker Eurozone members. 
Yet another type of imagination was also at play, acting as an instituting force to 
enact autonomy through the ability to re-imagine given rules and laws and bring about 
social change. Such imagination can thus ‘re-locate’ visions of the future back within 
actors’ own control by addressing the ‘self-occultation’ of society’s own power to 
institute itself (Castoriadis, 1997, pp. 132–133). Reconnecting with the instituting 
imagination is central to any political project aiming to open up the possibility of a 
different future. It requires actors collectively to recognise their own role in sustaining 
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current financial governance systems and strive for new imaginaries, relying both on 
their embodied collective memory, and on reorganising information collection and 
calculation. In the remainder of this article, we illuminate this dialectic by focusing on 
imagination as an interplay of representations, significations and affects underpinning 
debt relations. 
Representation 
Debt works on both collectivities and individual human psyches by producing images 
that are meant to move us emotionally or merely satisfy the voyeuristic viewer (Debord, 
1994), rather than providing any factual information. Indeed, as Bottici (2014) argues, 
on a global scale, images dominating media representations of the debt crisis seemed 
to be chosen on the basis of their ability to affect the public’s imagination. This was 
aptly demonstrated, for instance, in the grouping of indebted economies in the European 
South and Ireland under the zoomorphic terminology of PIIGS, evoking images of 
sloth, excess and impurity (Stavrakakis, 2014), and in the narrative of much-needed 
‘reforms’ that somehow centred on reducing support for the most vulnerable sections 
of the population (Fotaki, 2015). Absent from such representations were explanations 
of the reasons for ‘reckless lending’ by, for instance, French and German banks to 
Eurozone countries in Southern Europe and to Ireland. Importantly, such practices 
conjured up a representational gap, compounded by financial capital’s own ‘optimistic’ 
apprehensions of the future (Haiven, 2010). These involved positive imagery around 
market efficiency, manifested in ‘triple A’ ratings of financial institutions right up to 
the outbreak of the crisis. 
Dardot and Laval (2014) argue that these representations enabled risk to be 
offloaded in opaque ways, for example as securitised debt within financial networks 
that the new regulatory systems could not reach. A dislocated future is also engendered 
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by derivative contracts that, rather than simply being ‘ways that individual investors 
diversify risk’, serve to re-allocate social power and capital, thus functioning as 
‘imaginary constructs that do real disciplinary work’ (Haiven, 2010, p. 17). In such 
ways, images of risk and debt move further away from the public and into the private 
domain, in a ‘retreat to the private space’, while increasing liabilities are transferred to 
individuals, widening the representational gap between experienced consequences and 
a delayed future. Thus, the opaqueness of and disconnect between the present practices 
of debt securitisation and risk taking produce financialised imaginaries (Haiven, 2014; 
Haiven & Berland, 2015). Social life is increasingly defined by debt relations: social 
attributes of debt holders (health, class, gender) become part of what is cut out and 
rebranded, re-written as different kinds of financial risk, and distributed to classes of 
security (Adkins, 2017). 
Here, Castoriadis’s concept of imagination illuminates how we might intervene by 
creating alternative images that can be inserted into these dominant representations and 
alter existing ir/rationalities, thus enabling us to establish a different relationship with 
the future by re-politicising the present (Kenis & Mathijs, 2014). Such intervention 
relies on individuals’ capacity to respond collectively to debunk false and evoke new 
images, or infuse the old ones with new meanings. For instance, Damasio (1999) draws 
on neurophysiology to show how images of possible future scenarios precede the 
cognitive processes through which we represent the world and imbue it with meaning. 
In a sense, we need to feel and think about the future in order to decide what to do. One 
such example can be found in the Occupy movement’s famous  use of the ‘(We are the) 
99%’ symbol, to signify all those affected by the 2008 financial crisis – an image that 
reflects the sense of unity and power felt by people aiming to reverse the distribution 
of capital in response to financialisation. 
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Signification 
Applying Castoriadis’s notion of signification also explains how the post-crisis 
imagination relied on a variety of discursive means to project an image of the indebted 
future while closing off all other possibilities. A variety of means was deployed 
discursively to embed such significations, of which the dominant one was the morality 
narrative (Coppola, 2015) of deceived big lenders (the global banks), irresponsible 
individual borrowers and conniving states. As Sandbu (2015) argues, this narrative also 
characterises the approach of lender governments such as Germany to dealing with 
debtor states such as Greece, and more recently Italy (any debt must be repaid in full 
by cutting down public spending). However, the morality argument is spurious as it 
cannot, on its own, sustain the future projected by economic responses to the crisis. For 
instance, critics arguing for further market liberalisation often reject the ‘moral ground’ 
for austerity, arguing for its necessity on the rationalist basis of their own ‘economists’ 
utopias’ (see, for instance, Davies, 2018). 
Another related discursive trope is the debate on the best ways to address the 
consequences of debt in terms of the inequalities created (Graeber, 2014), as captured 
in the opposition between ‘Keynesian’ and ‘austerian’ camps in the aftermath of the 
2008 crisis. The former called for expansionary government spending as a means to 
overcome the worst effects of the crisis, which can be understood in material human 
terms (such as unemployment and growing poverty), while the latter insisted on 
curtailing public expenditure to reduce indebtedness, which is often presented as 
disembodied and abstract. Remarkably, in all these cases the evocative language used 
to describe the causes of crisis was couched in terms of individual vices, whilst 
‘solutions’ were presented as sanitised technical issues with no consequences for 
human lives. The ‘signification gaps’ between the futures charted by such solutions and 
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the meanings afforded to ‘debt’, ‘risk’ and ‘obligation’ in the present are widened, in 
what Cooper (2011, p. 31) calls ‘the delirium of debt’, reflecting the speculative nature 
of debt as the future promise of neoliberalism. The present is thereby pushed to its 
‘ultimate limit’. Insofar as debt must eventually redeem future promises, it is ‘not 
merely promisory or escapist but also deeply materialist: that is it seeks to materialize 
its promise in the production of matter, forces, and things’ (Cooper, 2011, p. 31). 
Lazzarato (2012) describes this process as ‘debt imaginaries’ that produce ‘enclosures 
of [a commodified] future’, thus limiting ‘what is possible to imagine’ (Haiven, 2015, 
p. 125). 
Yet dominant debt narratives must also be seen as expressions of a struggle 
between financial and alternative social imaginations, which thus remain open to 
challenge. Re-signification must rely on deconstructing how the present becomes 
eliminated and revealing the illusory premises of debt futures. Brassett and Clarke 
(2012, p. 17) show how the act of re-signifying the consequences of financial crises, for 
instance portaying home foreclosures and unemployment as ‘traumatic events’, may 
strengthen the practical potential of political movements (against financial authority): 
‘if home foreclosure could be (re) defined as traumatic, then “victims” could potentially 
claim legal compensation in circumstances where it could be proved the process was 
avoidable’. This is very different from a passive reliance on state intervention (in the 
form of ‘saving the banks’). 
Affect 
The imaginary construction of debt relations also draws on affect (i.e. on what is not 
represented and representable) to sustain public narratives and representations. The 
dominant imagination of debt accumulation legitimated lenders’ ‘disciplining 
operation’ in post-crisis Greece, where debt emerged as a nodal point of signification 
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(Stavrakakis, 2014, cited in Komporozos-Athanasiou & Fotaki, 2015) in relations 
between the state and its citizens. Such imagination ‘relied on the pastoral cultivation 
of a particular “ideal ego” with which every Greek citizen had to identify in order to 
satisfy the European gaze, the big Other, and be properly “readmitted” into the 
Eurozone family of “normal” member-states’ (Stavrakakis, 2014). Lenders and debtors 
are thereby affectively constituted in different ways. Excessive risk taking by the 
powerful (e.g. banks and government elites in the Eurozone) is often disguised and/or 
misrepresented as relying on rules, while the indebtedness of the relatively powerless 
(e.g. ordinary citizens) is cast in emotive terms as ‘the fault of the individual’. 
These discursive strategies are meant to evoke feelings of powerlessness in 
individuals who are expected to submit themselves to inevitable precarity and 
impending impoverishment, while deflecting their attention from the systemic causes 
of such outcomes. Regulatory systems operate in a similarly atomised way in imposing 
‘rational rules’ to control the irrational and irresponsible behaviours of individuals and 
countries. The feeling of ‘being corrupt’ is then affectively experienced as guilt and 
shame by individual citizens, cast as their own ‘moral failure’. Conversely, positive 
affects continue to animate beliefs in the market’s effectiveness, and the associated 
practices of making financial products more complex, while banks have again been 
hoarding capital since their rescue through public funds. 
These arguments point to the struggle of imagination to control the future, 
producing materially felt consequences that exacerbate existing power differentials. 
The imaginary construction of debt relations is a vehicle that carries them to a 
dislocated future. As Peebles (2010, p. 227) puts it, ‘debt can be seen as a method 
devised for a debtor to borrow speculative resources from his/her own future and 
transform them into concrete resources to be used in the present’, while for creditors, 
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current resources are exchanged for speculative future gains. Debt thus engenders a 
material as well as temporal link between creditors and debtors, with important 
affective consequences for the regulation of this relationship. 
Regulatory and fiscal policies implemented in the aftermath of the 2008 global 
financial crisis may ultimately lead to a state-sponsored ‘debtfare state’, with fiscal 
policy centring on suppressing wages, reducing working people’s purchasing ability, 
and ultimately affecting their livelihoods, health and ability to survive. Hence, the 
failure of austerity policies adopted by states such as those in the European South 
should be traced to neither ‘irrationality’ nor ‘failed rationalities’, but should rather be 
seen as reflecting a dominant set of images, meanings and affects concerning the future: 
the product of a struggle between different imaginations at work. 
Conclusions 
In arguing for a new conceptual framing of imagination for studying financial crises, 
this article makes three key contributions. First, we have explained the deeper, 
structuring role of the imagination in financialisation, where institutionalised beliefs, 
values and practices of risk taking (all of which may be presented under the guise of 
irrationality or failed rationality) become co-implicated in the production of dislocated 
financial(ised) futures. To illustrate the serious, tangible and potentially long-lasting 
consequences of this process, we have focused on the constitution of debt relations in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis, arguing that a specific type of dominant 
imagination was mobilised in order to enforce concrete political, financial and fiscal 
realities. Using Castoriadis’s framework, we have demonstrated that such material 
effects are predicated on mobilising images of an ever-distant future of prosperity and 
an increasingly inhabitable present, achieved through an interplay of representation, 
signification and affect. 
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Second, we have developed an anti-dualistic approach that unpicks and rejects a 
simplistic separation of the ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ (or the ‘calculative’ and 
‘animalistic’) as a starting point for explaining crises. Engaging with a long-standing 
sociological debate, we have argued that the rationality–irrationality relationship in 
financial markets is much more complex, as both are entangled in a process of 
imaginatively constituted notions such as price and risk, as well as debt and obligation. 
Rather than being a ‘reflection’ of economic rationality, these notions are ‘complex 
representations of social forces with political agendas’ (Luke, 2015, p. 280). 
Third, and relatedly, we have approached the financial crisis as an ongoing struggle 
between a dominant instituted and a suppressed instituting imagination. We have 
argued that these two types of imagination are intertwined and embedded in discursive 
and affective relationships underpinning constructions of reality. Such imaginaries are 
designed to veil the intensity of conflicts between different social groups, as manifested 
in the creation of private and sovereign indebtedness. In order to articulate alternatives 
to the financial crisis, it is essential to uncover its imaginary constitution, a project 
which, as we have argued, must rely on re-animating the sociological imagination. 
Our approach has important implications for economic sociologists, echoing 
Adkins’s (2017) thesis that a sociology of debt should not be confined to 
anthropological analysis of the ‘moral crisis’ of debt, but should also challenge the 
rational and material underpinnings of debt relations. Our proposed framework enables 
a better understanding of how policy ‘interventions’ that aimed to address the crisis 
were acted out, but also highlights their inherent limitations. The very idea of 
‘intervening’ remains ineffective insofar as it subscribes to and perpetuates a neo-
(rational) bureaucratic system. Our re-centring on imagination suggests that 
governments’ current regulatory focus serves the growing fusion of private and public 
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realms in financial life (Negri, 2015), promoting a future defined by their own type of 
imagination. Such a future relies on specific discursive and affective structures, and is 
grounded in a fantasmatic narrative of independent and observable rules equally 
applicable in all instances. Lastly, and importantly, our perspective challenges critical 
theorists’ endorsement of ‘imagination’ as something inherently ‘positive’ that needs 
to be ‘unleashed’ or simply ‘freed’ from the grip of financialisation (e.g. Haiven, 2015). 
Rather, we argue for an understanding of ‘imaginations’ in the plural, as intertwined, 
ever-struggling and co-institutive of financial and social futures. 
Future research on financial crises should examine more closely the struggles of 
imagination that underpin a certain politics of crisis, in order to shed light on how and 
where instituting imagination is able to challenge dominant instituted paradigms. This 
project might be especially fruitful in areas such as social movements studies, where 
there is increasing interest in grassroots opportunities and innovative practices found 
under circumstances of austerity, in new ways of co-production, and in new forms of 
mutual aid to address economic and political crises, relying, for instance, on self-
organising imaginaries (Lash, 2012). Highlighting the imaginary constitution of 
financial crises not only exposes some of the overlooked symbolic mechanics of 
financial markets, but also points to ways to pursue alternative radical imaginations that 
may widen common counter-hegemonic horizons of possibility. 
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Notes 
1 Despite recent calls to re-engage with C. W. Mills’s sociological imagination (e.g. 
Gane & Back, 2012; Gane, 2011), to our knowledge the concept has not been directly 
engaged to deal specifically with the constitution of financial crises. 
2 Such an entanglement is acknowledged, for instance, in the famous statement by the 
US Congress Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee Report (2011, p. 18): ‘We still don’t 
know whether the credit bubble was the result of rational or irrational behaviour.’ 
3 ‘Imagination’ and the ‘imaginary’ can usefully be distinguished, in that the former is 
an individual faculty, whereas the latter refers to the social/structural context of 
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imagination. Bottici (2014) cogently discusses this distinction, arguing that it 
corresponds with that between ‘reason’ and ‘rationality’. 
4 The critical analytical response to the 2008 crisis has focused largely on the role of 
lax regulation that ‘indulged derivative-issuing amongst trading institutions’ (Bryan & 
Rafferty, 2014), framing the crisis as ‘an expression of excess’ and calling for ‘a state-
led return to moderation’ (ibid., p. 888). However, most regulatory initiatives on 
derivative trading have been at best modest in their impact on curbing the lack of 
transparency in trading practices, with relevant institutions continuing to hold ‘opaque 
financial positions’ (ibid.). 
5 For detailed discussions of Marx’s analysis of fictitious capital, see Peebles, 2010; 
Knight, 2013. 
